Keynesian compromise

In 2000, Dani Rodrik proposed the "political trilemma of the world economy":

Rodrik argued that the world would have to choose only two out of three between "international economic integration, the nation-state, and mass politics". By mass politics, Rodrik means meaningful and effective democratic control.

We can choose economic integration and mass politics, if we give up political control at the nation-state level. Rodrik calls this "global federalism", effectively global governance in the mold of the United States. Subsidiary states still exist and matter to a degree. But regulation of interstate commerce gets hoovered to the highest level. And in an interconnected world, nearly all commerce, nearly all production and consumption, must be regulated as interstate commerce. Even transactions that are purely local are conditioned by and in turn affect larger markets.

We can choose economic integration and preservation of distinct nation-states, if we give up on meaningful democracy. Under this scenario, which Rodrik — after Thomas Friedman — calls the "golden straitjacket", distinct nation-states continue to exist, but international markets impose ever increasing constraints on their political choices. In Margaret Thatcher's infamous words "There Is No Alternative" to a narrow range of policies, if a country is to participate and compete successfully in global markets. In order to prevent catastrophe, nation-states become compelled to remove ever larger swathes of policy out from democratic contestation, into the remit of unaccountable technocracies like central banks and treaty organzations. As former German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble famously put it, "Elections cannot be allowed to change economic policy."

Finally, we can choose the nation-state and meaningful democracy, if we give up economic integration. Each nation-state can captain its own ship, regulate its own affairs if those affairs are neither subject to constraints from, nor responsible for dangerous spillovers to, highly integrated trading partners.

Rodrik called this last choice "Bretton Woods compromise", which is a clue that his trilemma is maybe a bit less sharply drawn than "pick two out of three". Economic choices are rarely binary. "International economic integration" is an umbrella term for many dimensions of policy, most of which are subject to lots of choices between all or none. Imports can be forbidden, or they can be permitted with tariffs. In the latter case, very high tariff rates would correspond to isolation, very low rates would be consistent with integration, and levels in between embody a kind of compromise. The postwar Bretton-Woods-era, as Rodrik describes it, was a pick-two-and-a-half out of three scenario. The period from 1945 until the early 1970s was a period of extensive and growing world trade. But it was also a period of fixed exchange rates, capital controls, and insulation of certain industries from global competition by tariff.

Rodrik, writing in optimistic Y2K, predicted eventually we'd find our way to global federalism, under which the whole world could enjoy the prosperity that universal trade and specialization might bring, while an enfranchised global public could ensure that this fantastic global market would remain embedded in society rather than become a monster lording over it. To his credit, he did not predict this would happen very soon, and suggested that twenty years from when he wrote, financial crises might force the world into a "golden straitjacket", or else backlash might provoke global disintegration via a protectionist backlash. Twenty five years later, we can observe that both of these predictions came true, one in quick succession to the other.

And so here we are. The place where we are would have been familiar to John Maynard Keynes. Like those of us of a certain age, he grew up in an era when economic liberalization and trade seemed poised to deliver remarkable prosperity, only to watch it all give way to war and protectionism.

I want to rescue "nation-state ⇔ mass politics" side of the Rodrik's triangle from the historical particulars of Bretton Woods, both the conference and the institutions it wrought. So I'm going to refer to this really two-and-a-half out of three arrangement, with nation-states, meaningful democratic politics, and moderate rather than complete economic integration, as the "Keynesian compromise".

In 1933, Keynes had drawn the lesson that

Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel these are the things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national.

However, by 1944, the system Keynes helped architect at Bretton Woods, and even the system he had more idealistically proposed previously, were quite open to foreign trade. The Bretton Woods order, at its inception at least, did retain some of Keynes' earlier skepticism of globalized finance. Capital controls were explicitly permitted, and countries were permitted to modify their otherwise fixed exchange rates to redress unbalanced trade.

To redress unbalanced trade. That was the fundamental work of the Bretton Woods order, of the Keynesian compromise. Keynes lived from 1883 to 1946, and to me the takeaway from that period of time, and from Keynes' interventions into international economics, is a kind of biohazard symbol, something very creepy. Call it "Econohazard". Affix it to a box secured with seven seals, cabining imbalance of trade, along with international indebtedness by other means.

Trade is supposed to be win-win. Both parties benefit. But persistently unbalanced trade has this strange effect of turning parties on both sides of the imbalance into self-perceived losers, into victims.

Surplus countries — think Germany with respect to Greece during the 2010s Eurocrisis — perceive themselves as prudent and generous, as innocents betrayed and sinned against when, inevitably, deficit countries suffer crises, and seek to devalue or default upon obligations that surplus countries accumulated in exchange for laboriously produced goods and services.

Deficit countries perceive themselves as having been led down a primrose path by eager sellers, then drained of both their financial net worth and their vigor. They are left emasculated, enervated, bereft of lost ability and capability to compete. Angry.

Both parties have a point. But then, of both parties, it is rather an infantile point. No one forces a trade surplus country to sell goods and services for potentially dodgy financial claims. No one forces a trade deficit country to borrow, or to tolerate borrowing by its public, in order to import goods and services.

No one forces these things. But countries may have been, if not forced, then strongly encouraged, to overlook imbalance by Rodrik's "golden handcuffs" regime, under which the price of economic integration becomes accepting free flows of both goods and capital. In my view, after the world abandoned Bretton Woods, it drifted toward an order — pick your pejorative, "neoliberal", "Washington Consensus" — that effectively required countries to abstain from tools by which they might have enforced trade balance.

It is perhaps ironic, perhaps you think it poetic justice, that the country usually seen as cheerleader of this consensus is now blowing up its own economy and hegemony via less-than-deliberate reaction to the consequences of what it advocated. The American partisan I still harbor will object and point out that the architects of the EU were every bit as blind and foolish. One thing you can say for Western elites on both sides of the Atlantic during this period from, say, 1983 until quite recently, is they were sincere in their error. The medicine they prescribed to the global South they also guzzled down themselves. As Nayib Bukele might say, "Oopsie..."

Here is the United States' balance of payments as a share of GDP, from the end of World War II to the present.

Despite the fact that, at the end of the war, the US was the only major industrial power whose factories had not been largely destroyed, by 1950, the US balance of payments is in balance, and it remains in rough balance through the early 1980s. Most of that period was good, economically, for the United States, and for its major trade partners. The institutions of the original "Bretton Woods compromise" are broken between 1971 and 1973 but the US endures and escapes its 1970s inflation while maintaining rough international balance.

One apology for neoliberal insouciance toward balance of payments is that unbalanced trade helped bring forth the greatest economic miracle in human history, the sudden, sharp rise of a billion plus Chinese out from acute poverty. Perhaps, but it's worth pointing out that Europe and Japan circa 1945 had become very poor, and their redevelopment from the ashes of war into prosperous social democracies did not require huge imbalances with trading partners. History is only run once. But it is not obvious that China could not have developed and succeeded with its market reforms in a world of balanced trade. If it had, the developed world that it joined might be more stable and peaceful than the one in which it finds itself now.

Perhaps Dani Rodrik was right back in Y2K, and by 2100, we'll all enjoy democratic enfranchisement in a prosperous, stable United Federation of Planet Earth. But for now, it seems to me the place that we want to go is back to Keynesian compromise, where we get two and a half out of Rodrik's three desiderata: nation-states, meaningful democracy, and economic integration.

It's that last bit, economic integration, that we only get half of. With Keynes, I say that the half we leave behind is cross-border finance. What we want is free but balanced trade. Tariffs are a tool poorly targeted to encouraging balance. Tariffs tax all trade, not just unbalanced trade. If instead you tax foreign payouts from securities, or otherwise deter cross-border accumulation of obligations, you can specifically disfavor imbalance.

If you insist upon balance and disfavor cross-border ownership, you restore scope for meaningful economic democracy, Rodrik's "mass politics". The neoliberal free-trade regime eroded democratic prerogatives primarily through its obsession with "non-tariff barriers". All kinds of government actions can affect trade or devalue foreigners' investments. Banning a dangerous chemical might constitute an "expropriation" from the multinational that manufactures it. An anti-smoking law might discourage imports and sales of Marlboros. "Sweatshop labor" is a non-tariff barrier from the perspective of nation-states that wish to offer strong labor protections. Joe Weisenthal points out, jokingly but accurately, that Europe's narrow streets disfavor US monster truck exports.

When countries compete mercantilistically for surpluses, non-tariff barriers are a big problem. The Trump administration's apocalyptic, now withdrawn, "reciprocal tariffs" were motivated in large part by accusations that bilateral surplus countries were "cheating" the US via non-tariff barriers. But under an overall balance constraint, to whatever degree non-tariff barriers discourage imports to a country, they also foreclose the possibility of exports. A country's regulatory environment can shape whether it is more or less integrated in world trade, but cannot be used drain other countries of tradables demand or to accumulate foreign financial claims.

If cross-border ownership is discouraged, multinational brands will prefer to license per-country franchises rather than directly hold property or plant. Then whatever "expropriation" is embedded in a regulatory change becomes a domestic political matter rather than predation of unfairly disenfranchised foreign concerns.

Of course, discouraging imbalance will not (and should not) yield perfect balance at all times. A trading regime that generally disfavors cross-border ownership doesn't mean it won't make sense sometimes for foreign owners to accept a penalty and invest directly, or for countries sometimes to seek and so affirmatively encourage foreign direct investment.

But it's the norms of the trading regime that matter. If our aspiration is a world in which capital is mobile and international ownership is the norm, then mechanisms like ISDS make sense. If we seek a world in which ownership is generally domestic, then they do not. If countries have the tools to unilaterally prevent trade deficits and a global consensus encourages balance, then running a deficit or surplus becomes an exception that demands justification. This sharply contrasts with the fading neoliberal view, under which imbalance reflects putatively optimal market outcomes, which deserve deference.

In my view, we are at the tail end of a half-century mistake. The Keynesian compromise — free trade, but subject to a balance constraint — was wise. We should return to it. If possible, we should rebuild it on an infrastructure of norms and tools that nation-states can unilaterally deploy to enforce those norms, rather than rely upon supranational institutions.

draft by Steve Randy Waldman
2025-04-20 @ 07:30 PM EDT

If we weren't idiots, Balance of Payments edition

Tomorrow is "liberation day" when Donald Trump is supposed to unveil a catastrophic slate of tariffs, layered on top of the belligerent tariffs he has imposed already on Canada and Mexico. Of course, you never know, because Trump's de facto policy is always policy uncertainty.

Trump's tariffs are stupid. Singling out and discriminating against particular countries is worse than stupid. It rips opens the demon seal of national grievance, from which wars and end times may emerge. The whole American political class is guilty of this sin with respect to China. But Trump takes it to another level. He takes such pleasure in the pettiest application of gratuitous insult. (Canada? Really?)

Trump's tariffs, and tariffs in most (but not quite all) cases, are stupid. Worrying about bilateral trade balances is stupid.¹

But worrying about ones overall balance of trade is not stupid. It is necessary. Here is where the inchoate tendencies jockeying behind Donald Trump do have a point. The US policy establishment has pretended that the international balance of payments doesn't matter. Or that even if it does matter, it derives from a deep, mysterious imbalance of humors in the American temperament. We insist upon investing much more than we save due to predillections impervious to price or to policy.

All of that is bullshit. A country's balance of payments matters, and is a legitimate and necessary objective of a country's economic policy. As Michael Pettis often emphasizes, a current account deficit is a drag on domestic demand, which then requires a fiscal offset to sustain full employment. A capital account surplus, the obverse and equivalent of a current account deficit, implies an ever growing pile of promises to foreign investors and creditors. Honoring those promises may impose constraints on policy that ultimately harm domestic constituencies. Dishonoring those promises is dishonorable, leaves a nation's reputation in tatters, provokes international strife.

There are good reasons, sometimes, for countries to run large current account deficits. There are good reasons, sometimes, for countries to behave mercantilistically, and seek large current account surpluses. But most of the time, under most circumstances, a country's trade should be reasonably close to balanced. Balanced trade composes: every country can pursue it all at once without suspending the laws of arithmetic. Deviations should be just that — limited and temporary, undertaken for coherent and well understood purposes. They should be offset by international partners who have good reasons to take the other side of the flow, rather than showing up like some kind of emergent shruggie and continuing indefinitely.

So if, as I claim, international balance-of-payment is a necessary object of policy, and current-account deficit countries like the United States should pursue reversion toward balance, why am I so mean to Donald Trump? Why aren't tariffs the greatest word in the English language?

Because tariffs are a stupid way to pursue balance. They interfere with trade on the real side of the ledger, rather than on the regulatory side of the ledger, which is finance. They require enormous infrastructures in customs inspections, and enforcement of weird, fine-grained categorizations of goods. They hold up physical processes. They penalize balanced as much as imbalanced trade. They are often imposed in hostile, country-discriminatory ways. They invite corruption by favor or waiver. There are much better policy instruments.

If we weren't idiots, we would normalize policy of the following form:

Ownership of every financial claim issued by a country's government, firms, or citizens would be categorized as "foreign" or "domestic". Maintaining this categorization, based on beneficial ownership, would be a role of financial institutions, which are, among other things, privatized functionaries of the regulatory state. Countries would either require disclosure of beneficial ownership information by any party that wishes to hold legally enforceable financial claims, or else assume holders are foreign if beneficial ownership is not disclosed.
All payouts to foreign claimants, whether interest or dividends or capital gains, would be subject to a tax that domestic claimants would not pay. The level of this tax would be a policy variable by which a desired international balance can be effected.

That's it! It's not so hard! It's a regime that doesn't perniciously discriminate between nations, industries, or importers. It's an approach that international organizations could normalize, that states could cooperate to enforce.

Unlike a tariff, a foreign-payout tax imposes no cost on balanced trade. It taxes only imbalance. If a country is running an undesirably large current account deficit, it can incrementally raise the tax rate, making it less remunerative for trade partners to hold financial claims as payment for unbalanced trade. No trading partner is singled out, no containers are held for inspection, no fuss, no muss, no hurt feelings. There's just a tax of financial instruments, which raises revenue and supports what should be universally recognized as a legitimate national interest.

I can't claim this suggestion is particularly novel. The aforementioned Pettis, along with partner-in-crime Matthew Klein, sometimes proposes similar solutions. I've long described these ideas as "capital account protectionism". Like most good policy ideas, this constellation of proposals lies strewn among blog posts and whitepapers, discussed for a moment and then abandoned.

The neglect has left real problems unaddressed and unaddressable. Now we get to watch Donald Trump blow up the world under pretext of filling the void.

When, someday, civilization re-emerges from the radioactive muck, let's, maybe, just try this?

Note: This piece is published April 1, only because April 2 is Trump's "liberation day". It is very much meant in earnest.

Worrying about trade deficits, bilateral or otherwise, is distinct from worrying about the diversity and resilience of sourcing for important goods and services. The latter should always be an object of policy.
↩

draft by Steve Randy Waldman
2025-04-01 @ 12:30 PM EDT

Delivering rough consensus

Hannah Story Brown offers an excellent piece on the "abundance agenda", reviewing books by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson and Marc Dunkelman (ht Ketan Joshi):

The “liberalism that builds” camp, in short, would find more allies among the progressives they criticize if they acknowledged that some things should not, in fact, be built. We need better levers to prevent abuses and better processes for getting public goods built. But the authors refuse to dignify the question of how to prevent existing abuses from worsening if we take away existing guardrails...

Dunkelman frames the dilemma this way: “[T]here is no way to serve the greater good without exacting some cost on at least someone ... Giving everyone a seat at the table doesn’t by any stretch guarantee a mutually agreeable fix. But, as we’ve seen, giving anyone at the table a veto almost ensures that nothing will be accomplished.”

Brown emphasizes that what this really amounts to is a quality of democracy issue:

Progressives want the state to do more of the right thing, and also less of the wrong thing. This balancing act and its attendant trade-offs will never be perfect, never resolved. This is the messiness of democracy, eternally heartening and disheartening. This is the task.

I want to add a small, hopefully helpful, clarification of exactly the quality of democracy we are currently lacking. What democracy is supposed to deliver is rough consensus outcomes.

A democracy cannot be expected to achieve perfect consensus. That's impractical for a polity of any size. But if a democracy delivers minoritarian or even narrowly majoritarian outcomes, it annoys, oppresses, dispossesses much of the public. Representative democracy, the whole sausage factory, all the wheeling and dealing that stands in for deliberation, are supposed to achieve outcomes a supermajority of the public ultimately assent to — perhaps not for every particular project, but at the level of the full portfolio state actions.

When a democratic state consistently achieves rough consensus, it earns the trust of its public. It can just do things. However, if the institutions of government do not yield near-consensus outcomes, but victories by narrow majorities or even canny minorities, members of the public are left with a terrible dilemma. They can protect themselves by agitating for veto points by which they can frustrate oppressive state action. This ultimately replaces desirable rough consensus with a paralyzing full consensus requirement and guts state capacity. Alternatively, they can concede the necessity of a vigorous state, and hope that the governing faction — whether a bare majority, a minority, or a singular autocrat — does good things rather than bad things from their perspective. Almost certainly, for much if not most of the public, it will not.

Our democracy (at least the one we had before November 5) has evolved to a structure under which democracy's main actors — political parties — purposefully destroy the possibility of rough consensus, largely by reshaping who we are and how we understand ourselves as an electorate. Each party must do so in order to remain competitive with a rival party that does the same. Our legislature no longer legislates in the traditional sense of shaping and reshaping and sweetening legislation until a supermajority are willing to sign on. On almost every major question, one party wins, one party loses, the discontent of roughly half the public is simply overridden.

Under these circumstances, there is no answer to the problems the abundance discourse laudably seeks to address. I for one am not at all interested in letting the Elon Musk administration, with the help of the narrow majority in Congress it keeps docile via threats of financing lavish primary challenges, just do things. I think they will do bad, horrible, things. They already have. Vetocracy now, I say.

But vetocracy now means vetocracy then too, when an administration whose purposes and intelligence I respect might do good things.

The state is the most important, most wonderful, and most terrible invention in all of human history. All the best possibilities for human flourishing demand creative, assertive, state action. The worst possibilities — total war, extermination, mass enslavement, human extinction — are possibilities at all because states can prosecute, enforce, and enable them.

The quality of state action is everything. It is not sufficient, as the abundance faction emphasizes, to simply get out of the way and let the state act. It is not sufficient, as has been the status quo in the US for two generations, to bind the state within a skein of veto points so elaborate almost nothing can be done until nearly everybody has been bought off.

The always insightful Dan Davies writes

Rather than the regulations themselves, we need to look at the overall system by which the regulatory state is brought to a place where it prevents things happening which have majority support.

That "overall system by which the regulatory state is brought to a place where it prevents things happening", even things that under other circumstances might find widespread support, is when government becomes a battlefield, when state action comprises victories one faction scores against the will of embittered others, rather than a portfolio of outcomes most of us understand ourselves as having assented to.

An effective state must recruit rough consensus. The institutions of a republic — elections, legislatures, media — are supposed to be machines that deliver rough consensus for state action. Instead we have a machine that reliably, predictably, for reasons we understand well, produces division, polarization, and resentment.

Until we fix that, we'll find that our demands for streamlining and our insistence on vetocracy — seemingly so opposed — are just two sides of the same spinning coin.

draft by Steve Randy Waldman
2025-03-26 @ 03:40 PM EDT

Voice of a Maryland

It's time for state governments to overtly and generously stand-up media organizations.

The death of local newspapers is much bemoaned, but that ecosystem which was once the beating heart of our public square is dead nonetheless.

I've long supported reforms along the lines Dean Baker suggests, letting citizens earmark public funds to media organizations they support. But we are in an emergency occasioned in large part by plutocratic control over media. We need to change the media environment rapidly and directly.

A mode of governance — like, you know, liberal democracy — cannot survive without a media ecosystem in which the case for that mode of governance is full-throatedly and vigorously offered, alongside more critical views. Outlets like Fox Media, X, and Facebook are mouthpieces for authoritarian plutocrats. They use opposing views to only launder the thumb they place on the scale. Outlets like The New York Times, ABC, CBS, CNN are corporate interests themselves. They rely upon the goodwill of regulators for getting mergers through and for other treats and goodies.

Very few prestigious, influential outlets will make a muscular case for social democracy, or even for what used to be "centrist" liberalism, when a vindictive Federal government seeks to suppress and discredit those views. In theory, of course, the Federal government cannot discriminate against corporate media on the basis of viewpoint. Ha. It will be trivial for political appointees to invent pretexts that hide the connection between editorial position and adverse regulatory treatment. Plutocrats control the commercial marketplace of ideas now, either directly or by credible threat.

It would not be a huge burden for state governments to run news organizations on the scale of the major dailies that their cities used to host. States have First Amendment rights against the Federal government. They have every right to speak, to provide news from their own editorial perspective, to communicate what they are doing and their case for why they are doing it.

"State media" might become blatantly propagandist, little Pravdas for whatever the governor is doing. But that sort of media probably would not attract much of an audience or engender much respect. Far better models would be Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, which are high quality, largely independent, news organizations, whose editorial perspectives are shaped by US interests. We could have fifty diverse but capable news organizations very quickly under this model.

Of course, Texas would have its news organization as much as Maryland would. Red state outlets might well adopt the editorial perspective of Fox News, OANN, Newsmax, etc. That's fine. They have every right. But our news ecosystem is already saturated with that viewpoint, so the addition of these new voices would do little new harm.

Our news ecosystem is starving for voices that make the affirmative case for high quality government, extensive public goods provision, pooling resources and working together to build a more just and prosperous society. Some of the publicly funded state outlets might take on this role. Even red state governments might betray some sympathy for the good work of government. The marginal benefit to social democrats would be much greater than the marginal benefit to plutocrats, if a stable of state-financed media organizations were to emerge..

But US states, like corporations, also depend on the Federal government. Won't their coverage be warped by the same pressures that turn corporate outlets into tongue-tied pussycats?

To a degree, perhaps. But the Trump Administration already overtly discriminates in favor of red jurisdictions and treats blue states with hostility. From a blue state's perspective, the marginal cost of pissing plutocrats off just a bit more than their baseline intent to destroy and subdue is low. Majorities of voters in their states sincerely want media that describe the world plainly and are unapologetic about supporting democratic values.

Plus, the existence of state media might open new avenues for states to defend against politically motivated discrimination. I don't know whether it's legal for the Federal government to discriminate between states on the basis of electoral outcomes, but it is certainly unconstitutional for it to discriminate on the basis of a state's speech. The thin-skinned narcissists who run the Federal government will predictably, inevitably, constantly lose their shit over stuff blue-state media outlets say. States then could argue that any petty and punitive kneecappings are in retaliation for speech and constitute unlawful viewpoint discrimination. It might or might not succeed. I'm as cynical about the current Supreme Court as anyone. As with corporations, operatives will always invent speech-unrelated pretexts for their sabotage. But at the margin, outspoken state media may help more than hurt blue states that will be targeted no matter what they do.

The traditional, liberal case against overt state media is that it would be overweening. State subsidy would confer so great an advantage over private speech that government might dominate the marketplace of ideas — not on the merit of those ideas, but by virtue of relentlessness and sheer volume. Neutrality among citizens is an important value that liberal states seek to uphold. But neutrality presupposes basic equality between the citizens that constitute the public square. That prerequisite is no longer in place. In a much more equal society, it might make sense for states to largely opt out of direct participation in media. In a tremendously unequal society, however, the speech that is overweening is speech purchased by plutocrats. In a world with Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Citizens' United, "neutrality" is a sham. The value we must lean upon is pluralism. The liberal remedy to bad speech is more speech. For that to work, the more speech must be loud enough to be heard above the din. Fifty US states can provide both pluralism and volume.

We are in an emergency. The survival of meaningful democracy in the United States, the hope for any kind of civilized society, is under severe threat. Private media are largely captured by fascists. A unique strength of the United States is its strong federalism. State governments could unilaterally and quickly restore an ecosystem of vibrant, diverse media with substantial capability and reach.

Let's do this.

draft by Steve Randy Waldman
2025-03-09 @ 02:00 PM EDT

Meeting Starter

Republican Representative and Senators are standing around with their hands in their pockets while Elon Musk unlawfully and unconstitutionally decimates the United States government, under the imprimatur of Donald Trump.

When Republican members of Congress meet with their constituents, the public expresses a certain, um, lack of delight with the current state of affairs. The growing discontent has spurred these honorable leaders to bold action. They increasingly resolve no longer to conduct open, public meetings where constituents might confront them.

In-person, human-to-human meetings are the heart of democratic governance. Much of why Americans have become so cynical about democracy is there are so few opportunities to participate in forums that put our representatives directly within earshot of us, and us them.

I think it's a mistake that we let our humble servants, our hired hands, set the terms of when and whether they will deign to meet with us. When we want to meet, they ought to show up and speak to us. They have one job.

Here's an idea: Suppose that we create public websites on which constituents and organizations can propose public meetings. It would be the responsibility of the proposer to price out a suitable venue, support staff, any catering, etc. Constituents could then reserve seats, pledging if they can afford it to cover their portion of the cost.

But constituents would be encouraged to pledge more than simply the cost of their own seats. The excess would first subsidize seats of those who can't afford a paid admission, then to create a "goodwill surplus".

The goodwill surplus would be donated. But not to the Congressperson's campaign. We have too much of that kind of legalized bribery already. The surplus would be donated to the government that our representative serves. For a member of the US Congress, the surplus would be donated to the US Treasury. For a meeting requested with a city councilperson, the surplus would be donated to the city budget.

Citizens have no way to compel representatives to take our meetings. If we are unwilling to bribe them with campaign donations, they usually decline. But with "meeting starter" websites, the asks and responses would be public and visible. Declining meetings with substantial goodwill surpluses would amount to directly costing taxpayers money.

Suppose a hundred citizens publicly ask for a meeting, proposing a reasonable venue during a recess of the representative's chamber, offering a goodwill surplus of a few thousand dollars for an hour and a half of their time. The representative can still say no. But she will have shirked the core obligation of her job, and she will have cost taxpayers those several thousand dollars as well.

She will have provided pretty clear evidence what kind of public servant she is. Which voters might take into consideration at the next election.

draft by Steve Randy Waldman
2025-03-02 @ 03:55 PM EST